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Summary fIndings
In 1991 and 1992, the European Union (EU)  and the  exports to the EU, significandly  improve  those countries'
economics  in transition of Central and Southern Europe  access  to EU markets. In 1992, the first year they were
- the CEE-5 (Bulgaria,  the former Czechoslovakia,  in force in Hungary, Poland, and the former
Hungary, Poland, and Romania)  - signed  the European  Czechoslovakia,  the Agreements  freed slightly less  than
Association  Agreements.  The Agreements  establish  a new  50 percent of total exports to the EU from import duties
framework for their mutual economic relationship,  and nontariff barriers (NTBs). In terms of the 1992
including  the transition to a free trade regime for  composition of cxports,  this "free trade" share in total
industrial products.  exports increases  over five years to about 80 percent for
The importance of the "Europc Agreemcnts"  has becn  the former Czechoslovakia,  60 percent for Hungary, and
underscored by the rapidly shifting trade patterns  70 percent for Poland.
between the CEE-5  countries and OECD markets, and  Although  there are significant  differences  in the
by the emergence  of the EU  as their major trading  composition of exports from CEE-5 economies  affected
partner.  by EU  trade liberalizing  measures,  these are the result of
Kaminski  examines  the significance  of the trade  varying shares of sensitive  (especially  agricultural)
concessions  granted by the EU  to the CEE-5 countries (1)  products across  countries, not dissimilar  of concessions
by analyzing  the incidence  of EU trade barriers on  from the EU.
imports from rhe CEE-5 before and after implementation  The EUs negotiation approach, as revealed in the
of the Agreements  and (2) by identifying  trade flows of  Agreements,  was to minimize  the adverse  effects of
groups of industrial products subject to different  opening up 'sensitive" sectors:  the time and the pace of
concessions. He focuses  on trade liberaizing measures  transition tends to be longer and slower for groups of
for industrial  products for which a free trade regime  products with higher NTB-coverage  ratios and higher
should be in pLae no later than five years after the  average tariffs. Whether by design  or no;  the variation
Agreements  are in force. (Excluded  are tcexiles  and  in products identified in various provisions assures  a
clothing, discussed  in the Uruguay  Round of Trade  more equitable treatment of CEE-S  countries, judging
Negotiations.)  from their industrial  exporc patterns in 1990-92.
Overall 1 the industrial product trade provisions of the
Agreements,  which affect about 80 percent of CEE-S
Thispaper-aproductof  the InternationalTradeDivision,  International  Economics  Departmnent-is part of a larger  effort
in the department to analyze  the new trading relations developing  between  Central and Eastern  Europe and the European
Union. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
contact Minerva R. Pateraa,  room R2-040, extension 37947 (37 pages).  June 1994.
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The European  Association  Agreements  concluded  between  the EC and CentraltSouthern  European
economies (hereafter, the CEE-51)  set a new framework for their mutual economic relationships.  To
emphasize  the difference  from the Agreements  on Association  signed earlier  by the EC with other  countries,
they are referred to as the 'Europe Agreements." Recognizing  the time-consuming  process of ratifying the
Association  Agreements  by parliaments  of both EC members  and Central European  countries, it was agreed
that the trade component-the so-called  Interim Agreement  on Trade and Trade Related Matters (hereafter,
ITAs)-will be implemented  before the treaty is ratified.  Former Czechoslovakia  (FCSK), Hungary and
Poland signed  the Association  Agreements  in December  1991,  and the bilateral  Interim  Agreements  on Trade
went into force on March 1, 1992. Bulgaria and Romania  concluded  negotiations  with the EC in 1992, and
the trade provisions  became operational  in 1993 (Romania)  and 1994 (Bulgaria).
While some details in the Europe Agreements  differ, they broadly follow the same pattern  Their
major provisions  include: (i) the introduction  of free trade in industrial goods within  a period of 10 years;
(ii) improved access for agricultural products, similar to  that stpulatd  in the Lom6 Convention and
Medierranea  association/cooperation  agreements;  (iii) a comnmitment  to harmonize economic  legislation
with that in the EC; (iv) the EC's financial  and technical assistance  (albeit no specific amounts  have been
indicated); and (v) the possible introduction  of free trade in services. In addition, the EC committed  itself
to gradually eliminating  tariffs and/or increasing quotas on "sensitive"  products-mainly textiles, iron, and
steel.
The objective of this paper is to dissect the trade provisions of the Agreements  and identify the
extent of change  in market access  in terms  of tariff and non-tariff  barriers as well as in terms of their current
significance  (using  actual  trade data through 1992)  for CEE-5  exporters  of industrial  products. An imporant
I would like to thmk Paul Armington,  Ronald  Duncan and Vikram  Nderu for iheir suggestions  and
comments.  I am also indebted  to Maciej  Lesny  for  his assistance  in coilecting  and processing  data for this project.
These  include Bulgaria,  the former  Czechoslovalda,  Hungary,  Poland  and Romama.2
question  whether the EC should have made larger trade concessions  goes beyond the scope of this paper. 2
The analysis  is limited to industrial  products simply  because  access to EC markets for agricultural  products
is governed  by principles very different from the largely market-oriented  trade policies covering  industrial
products. These products cover a broader group than  convendonally-defined  manufactures  and account for
around 80 percent of CEE-5 exports to the EC.
No-  attempt is made in this paper to attribute changes in CEE-5 exports to the EC to various
provisions of these Agreements. - Too short a  period has elapsed folowing  entry into force of  the
Agreements. Moreover, faictors  other  than improved  market access  seem  likely to be more important  reasons
for the improved  export performance  in OECD  markets  during the initial  stages of the transformation.  Thus,
a proper causal analysis  of CEE-5 export performance  requires a more comprehensive  ftamework?
H. DATA, METHODOLOGY  AND EMIRICAL  PROCEDURES
The improvement  in market access  involves  reductions  in restrictions.  against imports  either ftrough
cuts in tariff rates and/or in NTBs (nontariff  trade barriers).  Since extensive  use of NTBs often coincides
with high triffs,  i.e., product groups  subject to nontariff measures  are also subject  to relatively high tarifs
(Yeats, 1979), reduction in tariffs alone may not result in improved market access.  With te  decline i
tarffs as the result of postrar trade negotiations  under the GATT, nontariff  barriers have  become the major
insment  of protection.  Thus, an assessment of the degree to whWch  market access has changed must
include NTBs.
Information on tariffs and nontariff measures affecting industial  imports from the CEE-5 was
obtained  from the SMART data base contining  inter ala  information  on EC trade flows disaggregared  to
eight-digit  Combined  Nomenclature  (CN) codes as well as tarff and nontariff  measures applied by the EC
2 Available  evidence  shows  that much  deeper  concessions  would  have'a  strong  welfae-ininasing effect  in the
CEE-5  without  producing  significant  cost  to the  EC. See, among  others,  Messerlin  (1992),  Rollo  and Smith  (1993);
and Wang  and Wmiers  (1993)
3  For an extensive  anaysis of factors  accountable  for the improved  export  performanoe  of CEE-5  economies
in OECD  markets,  see Kaminsld  (1993).3
to these items. 4 Industrial imports  are broken down to groups identified  in the Agreements  in terms of the
CM. For each CEE-5 country, the appropriate  range of imports and of NTBs to be considered  is denoted
in the SMART data base.  Two major indicators, extracted from SMART, are employed. The first is the
proportion  of imports  subject to restraints, i.e., the NTB coverage  ratio.  The second is a simple arithmeic
average of tariffs calculated over a group of tariff lines.
There are three problems  with using these measures  as indicators of market access before and after
the entry into force of the liberalizing  measures stipulated  in the ITAs.  The first, relating to indicators of
market access, is general-not country-  .or region-specific. The problem is that both NTB coverage ratios
and tariff averages tend to be downward  biased in terms of measuring restrictiveness,  albeit for different
reasons. The NTB coverage  ratio downplays  the restrictive  impact  because  imports  of products facing  NTBs
are depressed, lowering their share in total imports. 5 Average tariff rates are understated, especially on
imports  that are subject  to GSP preferential  rates within l[nits and above them to MFN rates. (SMART  does
not take account of these limits.)
Second, the SMART data base has not been able to keep pace with the dramatic shift in trade
paerns  of the CEE-5 and the changes in their access to EC markets.  Its trade data is for 1988 while its
inventory  of nontariff  measures and tariff rates is for 1990. As a result, the data base incorporates  the GSP
status granted by the EC to Hungary and Poland in 1990, but not that extended to Bulgaria and the FCSK
in 1991.  The changes in export composition  which have taken place affect more the NTB coverge  ratio
An the unweighted  tariff rate average, as the latter is not sensitive  to the size of imports but changes  only
when new products are added.  Thus, the primary utility of these indices is that they point to areas where
the reduction of tariffs or NTBs would have an impact  on EC imports from the CEE-5.
Another reason for treating the results of this analysis with caution is that NTBs are often used in
response to increased  pressure from imports. Growing  levels of CEE-5 exports have already led steel and
chemical producers to urge the EC to implement  trade restraint.  The irony is that some provisions of the
4The  list of NTBs,  containing  25 measures  covers  the major instrments used-by  the Community  to protect
its markets. SMART  can be used  to generate  information  on average  tariff  rates (for a range  of imports  from a
selected  countay)  and the percentage  of imports  affected  by (selected)  NTBS. The data base and procedures  are
described  in UNCTAD/World  Bank (1989).
5  For a comprehensive  discussion,  see Yeats  (1979).4
ITAs make it easier to erect extra barriers against CEE-5 exports (Ostry, 1993:  11). For instance, trade in
steel had been governed by quantitative  quotas and pricing arrangements.  With the removal of these
restrictions under the ITAs, CEE-5 exporters have become more vulnerable to anti-dumping  actions.  As
a result, both the structure of NTB measures and their coverage may change as rapidly as CEE-5 exports
to the EC.
The empirical  procedure identifies  market access  before entry into force of the Europe  Agreements.
The trade provisions  of the ITAs distinguish  among various products in terms of changes in their market
access over the next ten years.  These products are identified  by CN codes.  In order to use the available
trade statistics, the CN items have to be converted into SITC (Standard  International  Trade Classification)
equivalents. The SITC. Rev. 3 classification  is used, because it is more extensive  and quarterly trade data
are available only in the Revision  3.  Since SITC. Rev. 3 is broader fian other classifications,  the loss of
accuracy associated with moving from the very detailed CN scheme (around 9.6  thousand items) to a less
disaggregated  trade classification  (3,118 basic  headings  or items)  is least. Because  export  data for the CEE-5
are less reliable, the study uses trade sWistics of the EC.
m.  PRINCIPAL FEATURES  OF THE ITAs
The liberalization  of EC-CEE-5  trade began  in the late 1980s  and climaxed  with the signing of the
Association Agreements in  1991 and  1992.  Access improved significandy following the collapse of
communism  in Central Europe in 1989- Some trade liberalizing  measures  were implemented  by the EC in
anticipation  of the successful completion of Europe Agreement negotiations.6 As a result, the level of
restrictions on CEE-5  exports into the EC was considerably  lower in 1990  and 1991  than in the 1980s and,
by the same token, concessions  granted in the ITAs improved market access in 1990-91.
Except for Romania which enjoyed GSP status, until around 1988 there had been no significant
6 For instance,  Hungary  and  Poland  were  granted  GSP  status  effective  on  January  1, 1990,  while  it was  grated
to Bulgaria  and the FCSK  in 1991. The problem  with GSP status  is that it is at the discretion  of the importing
country  and subject  to periodical  review. Therefore,  an indisputable  benefit  of the EAs  for the CEE-5  (as can be
readily  seen from comparing  MFN and GSP  tariff  rates  in Table  2) is that most tariffs  levied  on EC imports  will
be at least  lowered  to GSP  rates, thus  removing  uncertainty  concerning  GSP status  in the future.5
differences  in access of CEE-5  countries  to EC markets  (i.e., for the same  tariff lines). 7 GATT  membership
was not a differentiating  factor because  the EC conferred  MFN status on all countries. MFN status did not
mean most favorable  treatment  (as is the case, for instance, in the US market where GSP is the main device
differentiating  in terms of market access among  various sources  of supply). It only meant that their exports
were subject  to the same tariffs  as EC imports  from non-European  industrial  economies  which, in turL, were
considerably higher than those applied on imports from developing countries or European developed
economies.  Moreover, their exports were subject to  restrictions imposed only on centrally planned
economies. Because  of the state monopoly  of foieign trade, CMEA countries-including  those which were
GATT members-were defined as "state trading countries" exempt from GATT's Article 13, abolishing
quantitative  restrictions (Tovias  and Laird, 1991:15).  Basically,  tariffs applied on EC imports  from the
CEE-5  were higher than on imports  from developing  countries  and the EC used nontariff barriers against
the CEE-5  with higher  fiequency  and their types were "..  among  those  generally  considered  most restrictive
(i.e., quotas, variable levies, discretionary  licensing  schemes,  etc.)" (Olechowski  and Yeats, 1982). Thus,
before the collapse of central planning in the 1980s.  the CMEA had b_en at the very bottom of the EC
preferential  trading arrangement  (Schumacher  and Moebius, 1992).A
The Europe Agreements (EAs) signed bilaterally between the EC and CEE-5 governments  are
essentially  the same in terms of their structure. 9 They are composed  of a preamble, 122 articles grouped
in 9 chapters,  and annexes  containing  lists of goods  included  in the Agreements  as well as separate  protocols
and declarations. The preamble  of the EAs sets a framework  for political cooperation  and acknowledges
that association with the EC should be conducive to full membership of the Community.  Recognizing the
time-consumig  procedures of ratification of the EAs by the respective parliaments, the trade component of
7  Thi  analysis excludes  the former Sovie Union  whose exports were subjet  to more restfictive contls  thn-
applied against imports from other CMEA counties  (see Kamiaski and Yeats, 1993).
I  It should be noted, however, that this position  did not have a significantly  adverse impact on their access to
EC markets for at least two reasons: resort to the quantitative  restrictions  was limited; and, for products in which
the CEE-5 had comparaive advantage  there were few restictions (Pohl and Sorsa, 1992:54).
9 As of September 1993, the negotiations  between  Bulgaria and the EC were not completed. For the purpose
of esdmating  the ITAs' impact on Bulgaian industrial  exports to the EC, it will be assumed  that the Agreement  will
be similar in product coverage to that signed with Romama.6
the EAs (Tide mI:  Free Movement of Goods)-also referred to-  Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade
Related Matters--is to become effecdve within a specified period of time independently  of the ratification
of the EAa. Until the EA is ratified, all issues related to economic  relations between  the EC which are not
covered by the TrA would be governed by the Agreements  on Trade and Economic Cooperation (signed
prior to the EAs).1 0
From the point of view of conditions  relevant to market access  to EC markets, the rTAs are almost
identical.  They provide for the establishment  of a free trade area (excluding  agriculwure)  between the EC
and each of the CEE-5 over the period of "... a maximum  duration of ten years divided into two successive
stages, each in principle lastng five years."  Quantitative  restrictions on industial products are diminated
on the date of the enry  irto force of the ITAs except for textiles and clothing and products listed in the
Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community  (ECSC). The full hlberalization  of access to EC markets
would take six years, while barriers to EC exports will be eliminated  over a longer transitional  period."
This means that CEE-5 exports of industrial  products, including  textiles  and steel, will have duty- and NTB-
free access  to EC markets. In addition, market access  of agricultural  products  would  be enhanced, especially
if the EC moves ahead with the proposed reform of its Common  Agricultural  Policy-  scheme.
Recognizing  the problems  that CEE-5 counties face in their quest to establish market economies,
the EC has accepted  asymmetrical  treatment as a principle in some areas.  The EC has  -agreed to improve
market access of Central Europe at a  faster pace than its CEE-5 partners, and the initial reduction in
protection  by the EC is much larger than in the case of the CEE-5. Besides  a shorter timetable  for reducing
trade barriers, however, the agreements  allow  the CEE-5  governments  to unilatay  apply additional  import
duties but for a limited period. These duty rates, however, cannot exceed  25 percent ad valorem and cannot
apply to more  hn  15 percent of the total value of industrial imports from the EC.  Further, they can be
implemented  not later than three years after the estblishment of a free trade area in  dustrial products.
The ITAs also envisage a  transitional period for upgrading economic legislation in the CEE-5 to  EC
'  Hungary  and Poland  signed  nonpreferential  Trade and Cooperation  Agreements  in 1988. Other CEE-5
countries  signed  these  agreements  in 1989  and 1990.
. -'There  are difrces  in transition  periods  envisaged  for various  countries:  for FCSK  and Poland  it wiill  last
seven  years and for Bulgaria,  Hungary  and Romania  ten years.7
standards.  Among  the regulatory  measures  affected  are legislation  on unfair competition  and anti
monopolistic  regulations  now in force in EC countries,  to be deferred  by three years and legislation
regulating  state assistance  and subsidies,  patterned  after EC legislation,' 2 whose  implementation  can be
deferred  by five  years  with  a provision  of extension  for another  five  years. Until  those  regulations  are fully
implemented,  the GATT  subsidy  code  would  be used  to assess  distortions  in market  competition  caused  by
monopolistic  pracdces  and stare  subsidies.
The use of trade  restricting  measures  is based  on full symmetry,  however. As  the main  objectdve
of the ITAs is to phase out custom duties and NTBs, the ITAs contain clauses  securing gradual
implementation  of free trade  in products  covered  by the ITAs. According  to the Agreements,  neither  new
duties  nor any other  charges  with similar  effects  can be implemented  once  the ITA  is in force. The same
rule (the standstill  principle)  applies  to quantitative  restrictions  with the exception  of agricultural  products
(not included  in the liberalization  timetable)  for which  both tariffs and NTBs  can be freely  changed.
Furthermore,  in line  with  GAiT rules, signatories  may  resort  to various  import-liniting  measures  inchlding
anti-dumping,  safeguard  clauses  (only  if imports  cause  serious  damage  to domestic  producers  or disruptions
in the economic  siuation of a country  or a region),  protection  against  balance  of payments  disturbances;
protective  measures  against  disruptions  in markets  for agricultural  products  covered  by the ITAs, as well
as to introduce  bans  and  restrictions  permitted  under  GAIT rules.
Products covered by the ITAs, identfied by their CN code of tariff items,' 3 are arranged in three
groups:  industrial  products  (listed  in Chapters  25  through  97 of the CN, excluding  products  listed  in Annex
I of the  ITAs);  agricultural  products  (CN  Chapters  1  through  24, excluding  fisheries);  and  -fisheries,  covered
by the EC regulation  No. 3796/81  on the common  organization  of fishery  product  markets.' 4 Quantitative
restrictions  on industrial  products,  except  those  specified  in Protocols  1 and 2 of the ITAs  (subject  to the
ECSC  and  MFA),  are to be removed  on the date  of the entry  into  force  of the Agreement.  The transition
12  As specified  in Articles  85,86, and 92 of the EC Treay (Pohl and Sorsa, 1992:59).
13  The  CEE5 countries  are obligated  by ihe  EAs  to use the Combined  Nomenclature  in trade  with the EC.
'4  Although fishery products arc mentioned in the EAs, the relevant articles contain statements
quoting.  the EC regulation  applicable  to these products  (listed  in two separate  annexes)  and pronmse
further concessions  n,.  on a harmonious and reciprocal basis."schedule for eliminating  duties and quantitative  restrictions on imports from the EC varies among CEE-5
countries-but within ten years all quantitative  restrictions on imports from the EC are to be abolished.
Industrial exports from the CEE-5 will benefit from free trade access  to EC markets within  five years with
the exception of textile and clothing products (tariffs eliminated at the end of the sixth year of the
Agreement, while the elimination  of quantitative  restrictions depend upon the outcome of the Uruguay
Round).
The rules of origin (laid out in Protocol No. 4) stipulate  that 60 percent of the value of goods
exported  under preferentidal  treatment should  consist  of local or EC content. Thanks  to this rule, possibilities
for subcontracting  have significantly  expanded.  On the other hand, however, the rule is quite restrictive,
especially  for non-EC  potential  investors  in manufacturing  activity-since in the initial stages  new production
capacities often have to rely on imports of parts.  Some expressed  concerns that the rule may keep non-EC
investors out of the CEE-5 (Inotai, 1993).
The EAs envisage  enhanced  market access for agricultural  products. Some  quantitative  r_strictions
(Regulation 3420/83) are to be abolished immediately  and others will be either liberalized  gradually or
maintained pending  the outcome of the Uruguay Round. The EAs affect five main product groups: meat,
live animals, fruit, vegetables  and processed agricultural products.  Trade in grain is not covered by the
Agreements. Agricultural  exports will be permitted  to increase  by 10 percent in each of the next five years.
Duties on listed food products will be reduced by 69 percent, and CEE-5 countries will grant similar
concessions  to the EC.  It remains to be seen whether  these provisions  will help agricultural exports from
the CEE-5.
To sum up, the significance  of the EAs goes beyond the fall establishment  of a normal  GATT-based
trade regime.  It assures the very fast movement  of the CEE-5 economies  to the top of the pyramid of EC
preferential trading arrangements. Although the issue of EC membership  is not explicitly  addressed in the
EAs, the Agreemenss  do recognize  that the objective  of CEE-5 govermnents  is to join the EC.  Even more
significandy,  the way that they have been structured  leaves this option  open.  Furthermore,  the adjustment
in the institutional  and legal framework imposed  by the Agreements  has been designed  to bring CEE-5
economic systems  into line with the EC.9
IV. THE IMPORTANCE  OF INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS  IN CEE-5 ACCESS
TO EC MARKETS
Industrial products, as defined in  Chapters 25 through 97  of the CN,  consist not only of
manufactures  but also of some agricultiral materials, mineral  fuels, and ores and metals.  The equivalent
of this group in the SITC is much broader than a standard  description  of manufactures. Accounting  for
products excluded from the provisions  concerning industrial  goods,' 5 this group includes the following
SITC .Rev.  3  items:  (2-21-22-29-24403-24404-2631-2632-2651-2652-26851)  + 3 + (5-
59223)+6+7+8+(9610+971).
The provisions concerning  industrial  products are the most significant  part of the lTAs for two
reasons.  First, these products account for more than three quarters of EC imports  from the CEE-5 (see
Table 1).  With 93 percent of their exports to the EC fallig  into this group, the FCSK and Romania  had
-he  largest share among  CEE-5  countries. Bulgaria and Hungary,  with strong specilization in agricultural
products, had the lowest shares.
The importance  of the industrial  product group is further underscored  by the fact  that the share of
industriat  produc  in EC imports  increased  significantly  for all CEE-5 economies  in the 1988-92  period,
except for Romania.  Some portion of this increase in 1992 may be attibuted to a 5-8 percent fall in
agricultural  imports  caused  by adverse  weather conditions." However,  this decrease  was more than offset
by increased imports of industrial products triggered by the decline in domestic demand following  the
implementation  of stabilization-cum-transformation  programs and the collapse of previous intra-CMEA
trade.' 7
15  Anmex  1 of the ITAs  identifies  10 six digit CN items  faling into chapters  25-97  but excluded  from this
group:  albumins  (CN  3502),  natural  cork (CN 4501),  cotton,  not carded  or combed  (CN  520100),  flax, not spun
(CN  5301), and hemp,  not spun  (C:{  5302). In terms  of SITC.Rev.3.,  these  are: 0253, 59223,  24403,  24404,
2631,  2651, 2652.
16  The value  of imports  fell by 5 percent  from  Bulgaia, by 7 percent  from Hungary,  and by 8 percent  from
Poland.
1' The  exception  was  Romania  whose  exports  comtinued  falling  (in 1992  they  fell  by -0.5  percent).  Other  CEE-
5 economies  recorded  double  digit  growth  rates. As a resut, between  1988  and 1992  the  value  of industrial  imports
from  Bulgaria  increased  by 115  percent,  from the  FCSK  by 183  percent,  from  Hungary  by 127  percent,  and  from
Poland  by 152  percent.10
The link between the transformation  programs and the growth in exports of industrial  products is
apparent in data presented  in Tables 1 and 2: the share of industrial  products  in exports to the EC (see Table
1) increased  during the first year of the program (Poland-1990;  the FCSK-1991; Bulgaria-1992);  and the
average  growth  rate of industrial  exports  in the 198891 period  was  higher  than that  of non-industrial  exports
for the txoika  countries  while it was lower for the two Balkan countries  (Bulgaria  and Romania).
Table  1:  The  Rdative  Imporbace  of Iudustrial  Products  in CEE-5  Exports  to the  EC, 19892
Exports  of Industrial  Products  Sbare  in Total  Exports  to the EC
(value  in US$  million)  (n percent)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1988  1989  1990  1991  199Z
Bulgaria  418  430  537  677  899  73  72  72  73  79
FCSK  2367  2515  3053  4643  6687  91  89  90  92  93
Hungary  1777  1961  2795-  3331  4034  69  68  74  73  77
Poland  3092  3230  5089  6247  7793  78  75  77  81  85
Romania  2522  2649  1908  1706  1697  95  95  97  94  93
Since  Greece,  as of July 1993,  has not  reported  trade  data  for 1992,  its ammal  imports  estimated  on the basis  of first
the  quarters.
Source:  the  United  Nations  CONTRRADE  data  base
Eaier market access  for industrial  products  than  for agncltural products  has clearly faciltated this
increase in exports to te  EC.  As can be seen from data compiled  in Table 2, indlstrial exports fiLced
significantly  lower tariffs hn  other exports in 1990. This difference  was particularly  large for countries
which had GSP status-Hungary, Poland and Romamia.  The proportion  of export affected  by NTBs  was
also substantially  lower for industrial  products; the NTB coverage ratio for "other" exports was around
double  that for industial exports.
Although  tariffs have lost much  of their protective  significance,  the margins  of preference  between
CEE-5  exporters  and those who did not have GSP status  were quite  large. On average, MEN rates imposed
in 1990  on inports from Bulgaria and the FCSK  were around 7 percent as compared  with GSP  rates of 0.1
percent on imports  from the other CEE-5. GSP staus sigificantly improved  CEE-5  access  to EC markets,
and its short-erm impact  on exports was larger than that of the ITAs (Inotai, 1993). As can be seen from
Table 2, GSP status does not have much significance  for non-industial products.The level of vulnerability  to nontariff  barriers, as measured  by the share of imports  subject  to NTBs,
reflected the differences in export baskets among  CEE-5 countries. The average NTB ratio was larger for
countries  with higher shares of agricultural  products, iron and steel, and textile and clofting in their exports.
For instance, Bulgaria  and Hungary had the highest  NTB coverage.  ratios,  .mainly  because of the high shares
of agricultural  products.  At the other end, imports  from Poland and Romania  were least-affected  by NTBs
because of the less restrictive  access for labor-intensive  engineering  and consumer  goods  as weil as fuels and
ores and metals.
Table 2:  Pre-Agreemeut  Market  Access  to the EQ Industrial  Products  versus  Other Goods
Index,  1991  NTB  Coverage  Ratio  Simple  Average  Tariff  Rate-
1988=100  Indust  Otler  Indust.  Other
Indust.  Other  (in  percent)  (in percent)  -
Bulgaria  162  165  22.5  48.3  6.9  - 11.6
FCSK  196  163  24.0  52.5  7.0  11.7
Hungary  188  156  24.2  57.7  0.1  9.4
Poland  202  165  23.6  48.6  0.1  10.5
Romania  68  85  28.4  59.8  0.0  --  8.6
Sources:  Derived  from  the  UN COMTRAfDE  and UNCTAD-World  Bank  SMART  data  bases.
V. THE SCOPE OF PREFERENTIAL  TREATMENT  OF INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS  IN ITAs-
The lTAs distinguish  six various groups of idustrial  products with different schedules  of transition
to free trade and different mixes of trade liberalizing  measures, i.e, tariff and nonmariff  measures.  As for
the latter, quantitative  restictions on imports to tl.  EC are abolished  on the day of entry into force of the
Agreements.  The groups of  indLstrial  products subject to different time schedules  are as follows: (i) the
"one-year-delayed' free trade group (duty-free  access envisaged in the second year of the rrAs);  (ii) the
"four-year-delayed"  free trade group, i.e., at the beginning  of the fifh  year tarfs  are eliminted  (iii) the
"quotalfive-year-delayed"  free trade group (free trade at the beginning  of the sixth year of the ITAs); (iv)
the ECSC group (tariffs on steel fully are eliminated  by the end of the fifth year and tariffs on coal imports
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into the EC, excluding  Germany  and Spain, are eliinated  at the beginning  of the second  year for the FCSK
and Poland and by the end of 1995 for other CEE-5 coal exporters. Duties on imports  into Germany  and
Spain will be abolished  by the end of dte fourth year of the ITAs); (v) the MFA group (quotas bilaterally
negotiated  and the shift to a free trade regime tied to the Uruguay  Round of trade negotations); and (vi) the
"immediately"  free trade group (a residual group of industrial p:oducts including items not covered by
separate provisions).
While the detailed  provisions are similar, there are some differences in assignment  to the above-
mentioned  groups. For instance,  tariffs on aluminum  oxide and hydroade (CN. 2818200  and 2818300)  on
imports from Romania  are held to a four year transition  to duty-free  sus  (group ii) whereas on imports
from other CEE-5 countries  these are subject to a one-year  schedule  (group i).  The only area where there
are significant  differences in both coverage and triff  and quotas concessions  is in the "quota/five-year-
delayed"  free trade group. Hungary  was granted  a different schedule  of tariff reductions  (by 10% annually,
other CEE-5  countries  by 15%) and quota/ceiling  increases  (15% per year, others 20% per year). The list
of discrepancies  for this group is the longest. While it is unclear whether  it was intended  by EC negoatr,
the dispersion in shares of this group in 1991 industria imports  into the EC is significantly  lower tian in
shares of a group including  products listed in all ITAs. MFA and ECSC groups cover  the same  CN items.
In addition, duties  on coal imports  into the EC (excluding  Germany  and Spain) from the FCSK and Poland
were eliminated  by the end of 1992, while on imports from other CEE-5 countries  by the end of 1995 (on
January 1, 1994, they will be reduced by 50%)_
The Copenhagen  Summit of the EC offered additional  concessions. As far as industrial products
are concerned, these included acceleration  of custom duty eliminatim: (a) on products of the "four-year-
delayed" group (duties are to be abolished wihin  two years); (b) ECSC-steel products (duties are to
abolished  after four rather than five years); and (c) the MFA group (after five years rather than six years).
A.  The "One-Year-Delayed'  Free Trade CGroup
The "one-year-delayed"  free trade group comprises  products for which customs duties  are reduced
by 50 percent upon entry into force of the Agreement  and eliminated  at the beginning  of the second  year.
In terms of eight digit CN items this is a relatively  small group consistng of 92 tariff items.  It includes13
mainly industrial raw materials.  Imports from the FCSK and Poland increased quite dramaticaily in the
1988-91 period, although they were very low in the base year.  Since these increases were probably
triggered  by contraction  in industrial  activity  during the first year of the transformation  program, their future
growth potential may be limited. This group accounts for a small share of total CEE-5 industrial exports
to the EC (in 1991 their share was below 2 percent).
However, the fast move to duty-free  access is a more significant  concession  than the share of these
imports might indicate.  First, average NTB ratios on EC imports of this group from CEE-5 countries
(except for Poland) are significandy  higher than on industial products in general (see Table 3).  For EC
imports  from Bulgaria, the rado is by 11.8 percentage points higher, from the FCSK 16 percentage  points
higher, from Hungary 28.4 percentage  points higher, and from Romania  24.4 pernnage  points higher (see
Table 2 and 3).  The average NTB ratio for EC imports of ail industrial products from Poland is 8.2
percentage points lower than for imports falling within the one-year-delayed  free trade group.
Second, with the exception  of the Balkan countries, CEE-5 exports of this group expanded  rapidly
in the 1988-91  period.  The average growth rate was substantially  higber than the average for CEE-5 all
industrial exports, especially  in the case of exports from the FCSK and Poland.  Moreover, exports from
these countries  crowded out other suppliers, as their share of these EC markets increased  from 0.1 percent
(both for the FCSK and Poland) in 1988 to 0.4 percent for the FCSK and 0-6 percent for Poland in 1991.
While it is unlikely  that such a rapid expansion  is sustanable over the medium-term,  the elimination  of trade
barriers has significantly  improved  their competitive  position.
Table 3: The "one-year-delayed'  Free Trade  Group:  Exports to the EC an d Pre-ITAs Market  Access
Exports  Share in Industrial Index, 1991  NTB Coverage  Simpb Average  Range  of
1991  Exporis, 1991  1988=100  Ratio  Tariff Rate  tariff mres
Max-NIin
(US$ min)  (in  percent)
Bulgaria  10  1.4  93  33.3  5.1  6.0-0.0
FCSK  53  1.1  400  40.0  4A  18.3-0.9
Hungary  23  0.7  126  52.6  3.0  7.04.0
Poland  27  OA  500  15A  6-2  18.3-0.0
Romania  1  0.0  60  40.0  2.0  3.240
Sources: See Table 2.14
But the evidence  is inconclusive  yet.  In 1992  the 50 percent margin of tariff preference  had some
impact  on imports  from the FCSK and Poland  but not on imports  from Hungary. The value of imports  from
the FCSK and Poland increased by 60 and 85 percent respectively  while that from Hungary fell by 10
percent. The two Balkan  countries-with no preferential  access  in 1992-recorded  contractions  by 17 percent
(Bulgaria)  and 26 percent (Romania).
B.  The "Four Year-Delayed"  Free Trade Group
This group contains  products for which tariffs are reduced  by 20 percent oi "..e day of entry into
force of the ITAs, and then lowered  by 20 percent annually  so that they are fully eliminated  at the end of
the fourth  year.  There are significant  differences  in the list of products  specified  in Annex  Ilb of each ITA.
The ITA between the EC and the FCSK contains  the smallest number  of items (3 eight digit CN items),
while the list in the Polish ITA is the most extensive  containing  16 CN items. Leaving aside  the variation
in products  appearing in respective  Annexes  Ilb of the ITAs, they all are primary intermediate  goods, i.e.,
lightly-processed,  resource-intensive  products such as ferro-manganese  (with a carbon  content of less than
2 percent), ferro-silicon, unwrought  alumium,  and zinc and lead alloys. Excluding  Romania, the group
accounts for a minuscule share of CEE-5 exports to the EC.  In the 1988M91  period EC imports of these
products from the CEE-5 were highly volatile."
A quick  perusal of data compiled  in Table 4 suggests  that duties  levied on this group  -are  relatively
low and the NTB coverage ratio varies significantly  across CEE-5 counties with imports  from the FCSK
subject  to full coverage and those from Romania enjoying  "NTB-free"  access. However, this group has
limited  potential for growth. The provisions  of the ITAs are not likely to provide  stimulus  to eorts  with
the possible exception  of Romania  once its economy  rebounds. Although  the growth  rates of EC imports
from the FCSK  and Poland  were impressive,  EC imports  of these  from the region  fell in the 1988-92  period.
Moreover, neither a one time upswing  in Bulgarian  exports to the EC in 1989 (tebir value almost tripled)
nor steady growth in Hunprian  exports uitil  1990 were sufficient to compensatc  for the contraction  in
Is EC imports  fiom Bulgaria  increased  by 164  percen in 1989  and subsequendy  contctedin  the 1990-92
period. Imports  from  the FCSK  increased  by 28 percent  in 1989,  by 127  percent  in 1990  and by monlyn  8 percent
in 1991. The  value  of imports  from  Hiungary  increased  in bodL  1989  and 1990  (by 22 and  36 percen respecdvely)
and fell by 36 percent  in 1991. Imports  from Poland  fell in 1989  (-6.4%),  tripled  in 1990  and doubled  in 1991.15
Romania's exports. Among  the CEE-5, Romania  used to be the most important  supplier  of dtese  products
to the EC. However,  Romanian  exports  collapsed  in the 1988-91  period,  with its share in EC imnports  falling
from 1.9 to 0.4 percent.  The shre  of the CEE-5  fell, however, from 2.3 percent to 1.6 percent.
Table 4: The "Four-Year-Delayed" Free Trde  Group: Exports to the EC and Pre-fTAs Mirket  Access
Exports  Share in Industrial Index, 1991  NTB Coverage  Simple  Average  Range of
1991  Exports. 1991  1988=100  Ratio.  Tariff Rate  tariff rates
Max-Min
(in USS million)  (i  percent)
Bulgaria  1  0.1  132  20.0  3.3  6.2-0.0
FCSK  2  0.1  312  100.0  3.1  6.2-0.0
Hungary  17  0.5  107  40.0  3.6  6.2-0.0
Poland  49  0.8  593  13.3  3.3  6.0-0.0
Romania  27  1.6  21  0.0  3.2  6.0-0.0
Sources: See Table 2.
During the first year of the  lTAs,  exports  of these products fell (with the exception  of those from
Poland which continued  to expand  by 18 percent).  Despite a 20 percent reduction in tariffs, the value of
exports from the FCSK fell  by 38 percent  and from Hungary  by 35 percent  The contraction  in exports  from
Bulgaria (-52%) and Romania  (-77%) was even larger.
C.  The "Quota/Five Year-Delayed" Free Trade Grou_p
The trade liberalizing  measures in the ITAs for this group of industrial products are a mixtur
of cuts in custom  duties and increases in tariff quotas and ceilings. Custom duties are suspended  within
the limits of tariff quotas to be increased annually. The ITAs contain different stipulations  concerning
the annIua  growth rate of tariff quotas: 15 percent for imports  from Hungary, and 20 percent for imports
from other CEE-5 countries.  Simultaneously,  custom duties on imports in excess of quotas are to be
reduced progressively  to zero by the end of the fifth year.  The schedule of reduction in these customs
duties, beginning on the day of entry into force of ITAs, calls for annual cutbacks of 15 percent on
imports from Bulgaria, the FCSK, Poland and Romania  and 10 percent on imports  from Hungary. ITAs
share the same stipulation  that all duties be scrapped by the end of the fifth year, however.16
The group subject to these provisions is the largest in terms of CEE-5 imports into the  EC,
accounting for between one fourth and one third of their industrial inports  (see Table 5).  It includes
products of most industrial sectors (organic and inorganic chemicals, some leather products, cork and
wood products, glass, some steel products not covered by the ECSC, copper and copper products, electric
machinery, optical goods, plastics, footwear, clothing accessories, furniture, motor vehicles, toys, etc.).
Furthermore, the group is the most diversified in terms of coverage in separate ITAs. In contrast to other
groups, there are substantial differences in the lists of items in the individual Agreements.  Lists for
Hungary and Poland are more extended in terms of the number of CN items.' 9
Table 5: The "Quota/Five-Year-Delayed"  Free Trade Group: Experts to the EC and Pre-ITAs  Market Access
Exports Quoas  Share  in Industrial  Index 1991  NTB Coverage  Simple  Average Range  of
1991  for 1992  Exports  t  the EC 1988=100  Ratio,  Tariff  Rate,  tariff  rates
percent  Max-Min
(in million  of 118$)  - ---(in percent)
Bulgaria  111  na  16.3  243  18.8  8.6  25.84.0
FCSK  1230  379  26.5  213  20.6  8.7  25.8-0.0
HungarY  810  484  24.3  175  21.0  0.0  0.0-0.0
Poland  1477  575  23.6  213  21.7  0.0  0.0-0.0
Romania  516  366'  31.4  83  23.7  0.0  0.0-0.0
'for  1993
Sources:  See Table  2 and  lTAs (Annex  3).
Pre-ITAs  market access  was  better for this group tan  for all industial products. The NTB coverage
ratio was lower (by 24  percentage points) than for all industrial products (see Table 2 and 5).  The average
tariff rate was higher  than that on all industial  products  for Bulgaria and the FCSK,1  but lower  for other
CEE-5 countries.  For the reasons discussed in Section II, the "real" average tariff rate for the latter
'9  The total group, including items-  specified  in all ITAs, covers 678 eight-digit CN items of which 677 are
subjea to GSP rates.
21 Imports from these two countries enjoyed GSP status in 1991. Hence, the average rare reported in SMART
would be near zero, as almost all items in this group had GSP teatmet.17
countries  was higher depending  on tariff quota utilization.?
It  is difficult to assess the extent to which the ITAs improve market access for this group of
idusal  products. First, for some  products  the EC sets quows  and for othes ceilings-imports  below
ceiigs  and witin quotas  dre duty free.  This is an important  disdnction,  complicating  assessment  of a
'liberalized"  component  in this group.  Duties  on imports  of products  exceeding  quotas  are imposed
automatically  whereas  duties  on those  exceeding  ceilings  are levied  only  if domestic  EC  producers  demand
it  As a reu,  it is impossible  to predict  the size  of "above  ceili"  imports  that  wil be subject  to tariffs.
Second,  one should  note  that  this  group  on average  faces  hgher MFN  tariffs (applied  on "above
quota"  imports)  an industrial  products  in total.  Since  the base for tff  reducto  envisaged  in the
Agreements  is about 50 percent higher  than the average on industrial  products,2 the margins  of preference
for CEE-5  exporters are substantial. Taking into account  that triff  rates are the same for large clusters  of
CN items, one may assme  that the simple  average auiff rate will be fan  in line with the schedule  of
tariff  reductions  for this  group.
Third, the ceiling or quo a  utilization' ratio varies across different  products.  If quotas were set
in a fixed  relationship  to previous  export  p  ance,  then  the duty-free  compoent of this group  durng
the first year  of the ITAs  woud be equal  to the total value  of quotas.2?  But this is not the case: neither
growth  rates  of quotasfceilings  were  set m te  ITAs  in any  relationsbip  to import  growth  rates  nor quotas
or ceings  reflected earlier levels of imports. For instance, average growth  rates of iports  from both the
FCSK and Poland in the 1988-91  period were around 12 percentage  points higher than scheduled  ammal
increases  in quotas (20%)  and from Hungary  were 6.1 percentage  points higher  ftam  the scheduled  increase
21 SMART  keeps  track  only of dutics  levied  upon morts  not  exeding  tariff  quotas  and clngs.  Ims
xceding  thse hmits  wer subjec  to MFN  rats independy  of dtdr GSP  status.
For imports  exceeding  quotas  or oeiling,  the simple  aveage  MFN  tariff  rate  is awmnd.9  percent,  while
average  taiffs on all industial products  are about  6 pernt.
23  Had  the fre trade compoet been equal  to quota,  it would  have  been  te  largt  for-Hungary  and
Romania  (with  69 percent  of imports  falling  into  the free  trade component),  followed  by Poland  (38  percent)  and
the FCSK  (30  percent).  This  meas that  only  31 percent  of Hugaian  and Romanian  imports  into  the EC  in 1991
would  be subject  to MFN  rates,  while  the  s  ratios  for the  FCSK  and  Poland  would  be 70 percent  and  62  pert
wespeclvey.  However,  tis  xould  not  ggest  that Hunga  and Romania  have  obained  a better  deal  from  the EC
haoher  CEES govenmenmt18
(15%).2
Most quotas set in  he ITAs with the Visegrid counies  are the same in  of their past
export performance.?  For iustance, the Polish quota for polyetylene is the s-me as that for the FCSK
and Hungary, while  its exports to the EC in 1991-were  a small  fraction of other CEE-3 exporls (see Table
6).  TIis lack of a link  between  tarff quotas and past export  performance  is especially  manifest  in the cas
of cars.  The tariffquota of US$ 91 million  set for motor  vehicle  imports  (CN.87032110  through 8703909)
from the FCSK (ECU 80.483 million  as compared  with ECU 125 million  for  ie other two ccmmtries)  is
about one third lower than that for -Hungary,  even though in 1990 FCSK inports it  the EC were much
larger than Hungrian  ones (US$ 84 millon as compared  with US$ 2 million)?'  It is wort  nodng hat
actual imports from dte FCSK were significanly larger than quotas for all products listed in Table 6
(especially  for wire of iron or non-alloy  steel whose.  share of quota  was only 6 percen).  However,  this did
not prevent  FCSK producew from increasing  exrs  of these products in 1992-the only excption hi the
sample  was polyethylene  whose inports i  the EC declid  during te  first year of the [TA.
WiftIo  a detailed  analysis  of export  capacity  for each  tariff quota/celing group,  which goes  beyond
the sope  of this paper, no firm  judgment  n  be passed on the extent of EC concessions. Somen  isgb
can be derived from the sample  of products  presented in Table 6, however.  This sample, accounting  for
30-35  percent of the w  alue of quotas and for 18 t0 29 percent of troik  exports of these  produts  to the
BC in 1992, is quite  large and, terefore,  vepfor  this group?  The duty-free  compone  vares
24 This  should  not suggeast  that  te  rrAs do not contain  siifict  ocessions.  in fact,  market  access  for  thes
products  will  move  to duty-fee trade over a five-year  period.
2s Examples  of different  tariff  quotas  or ceilings  interaa  indclude:  the  FCSK  has  lower quotas  for acids  and
salts  (CN.  2981400)-ECU  210,000  as compared  with  ECU 368,000  for Hunar  and Poland),  for leather  clothing
and apparel  accessories  (CN.4203100,  42032100,  42032991,  42032999,  42033000,42034000-ECU  4.3 million  as
compared  with ECU  6.6 miion).  Tbe  FCSK  and Hungay have smaller  quota  for fibrbords  (CN.4411-ECU
4 million  vsus  ECU  7 million  for Poland). The  quotas  for Bulgaria  and  Romania  are  an avere  around  5 percent
higher  than  for the CEB-3.
2  On  the  odter  band, it could  have  been  purely  acdental that the Polish  quota  (the  same  as the Hungarian)
was close  to the value  of its imports  into the EC in 1988  (US$  145  miion) and 1989  (USS  128  million).
Latecomers-Bulgaria  and  Ronmania-=a  not  included,  simply  because  dir  respcive Agrmnt  wit  the
Co  is  went  into  force  a year  lat.19
Table  6:  Trade  Measures  Appied  to Sdected  Iteu  of tho  "QboIlvYer-Delaedroe  Trde"  group
-FCS  Hungary  PoLand  NFNs(lumLOeverage
tariff  rate In 
?srngwr  Newr  VekWdex  (S  .3.7J12)  lO 
Tariff  Quota  CmiLlIon  of US$. 1992  91  141  141
Imports  (miLlion of USS$,  1992  m  25  Z59
1991  210  3  39
qltiliztiun  retito  in prmt).  1992  299  la  l
Duty  free cawonent  Cin  percent), 1M  33  100  5S
Polykae  (SriC.  r.3.57112)
Tariff Quota (miLlion of USS),  1992  15  15  15
[Worts  mtillion of US$3.  1992  20  30  1
1991  34  31  1
qUtiLizntiun ratio  (Sin  purmtu.  1992  IN  201  7
Duty free camnet  (in  percent), 1992  76  50  100
Fksul*n  (SITC.Rv.3.8213)  LA
Tariff  Quts  (milLiLon  of US$3,  1M  7B  0  75
Ieqorts  (million  of US$3 1992  121  66  242
1991  61  54  192
UUtiLiz.tio  ratios  Cin  perct),1992  156  P/a  311
Duty free coonent  (in  percent),  1M  64  0  32
Appwd and CloSing  mui  of monxlu  (SI  TC.e3.UI1+  IE 477) 
Tariff  Guots CmiLLion  of US$3,  1992  5  8  a
Imports (million  of  USS$,  1992  11  29  6
1991  8  24  10
ftiLizatimn  ratio  Cin  pec  t)  1992  23Z  3C6  aZ
Duty free  component (Cn  percent), 1992  43  26  100
Glaze  Cemmlcs  (SlltRet.3SZdS) 
Teriff  Quota  (miLlion of US$), 1992  4  4  4
Imports  (million  of US$), 1992  Z  7  3
1991  13  7  .7
qUtiLizntim  ratio"  Cin  pero  nt),  1992  6w3  152  7
Duty free cowponent  Cin  percent),  1M  16  66  100
VFWi  of Zi  or  nwxn-aey  Med (SflYZ.Zev34fh1Z-12)
Tariff  Quota (million  of USS3  ,  1992  2.2  2.2  2.2
leports  (million  of US$3, 1992  35  2  5
1991  33  3  6
UitiLization  ratio"  (in pucuit),  1992  1644  80  VA8
Duty free couponent  Cin percent),  1M  6  10W  40
Mersmundaim  (A.)  Share  of the sample  in:
- total  imports of  the grcoup  (in  percent). 1992  30  i8  27
1991  29  16  16
- total  quotas for  the group (in  percent),  1992  51  35  43
(B3  Share  of duty free  iWports Cin  percnt).  1992  40  34  47
Source:  see Table 5.20
widely  for products  and countries. 2 This suggest that the EC was concerned  mosdy  with proecting
domesdc  markets  and ignored  dte interests  of CEE-5  producers. Nonethdeless,  CEE-5  coumtries  have
obtained  significant  concessions.  As can be seen  fom  Table  5, a subsmandal  proportion  of imports  of
products  bad  duty-free  access  to EC  markets.  Its share  in exports  for this  sample  was between  34 and  47
percent. Furthermore,  the margins  of preference  provided  in the ITAs for some  exporters  are quite
substantial.  For instance,  MFN  tariffs  on polyethylene  and cars  are relatively  high  (10 and 12.5  percent,
respectively):  since  CEE-3  suppliers  of these  products  had  free  access  to EC  makets  for a very  significant
proportion  of their exports  (between  33 and 100  prcent), this  has undoubtedly  given  them  a subsantial
compettive  edge  over  MN  suppliers.
Finally,  in terms  of 1992  exports  to the EC, tff  and  ceilings/quotas  seem  to be on average  less
'restraining"  on cars than  on other  products. This conclusion  can be drawn  from  comparing  shares  of
passenger  car  quotas  in total  quotas  with  the  shares  of  these  exports  in eos  of tis group. Tariff  ceilings
and quotas  applied  against  exports  of this  group focus  on passenger  motor  vehicles,  accountig for 47
percent  of the  FCSK's  value  of quotas  for  this  group,  for 79  percent  of Hungarian  quotas,  and  for 55  percent
of Polish  quotas.  Their  shares  in exports  of this  group  are 16  percent  for  the  FCSK,  3 percent  for  Hungary
and 14 percent for Poland,  suggesting  that quotasfceilings  free trade component  of their exports  is
considerably  larger  in products  which  are not  listed  in Table  6.
C.  The MPA  Grou,
The ITAs  contain  a special  protocol  addressing  market  access  for texiles and clothing  (CN  50
thugh  63 exchluing  520100,  5301, 530?') subject  to the MFA restricting  "... the volumes  of most
imported  textiles  and  clotung  products  into  North  America  and  Westn Europe  from  developing  countries"
25  The "duty  -free component  is equal  to the sum  of quotas  (if the value  of imports  exceed  the tariff  quota)
or the  value  of exports  (if it is lower  than  quota). Excluding  cars, the duty  free  shar raises  for the FCSK  from
40 to 48 pern,  and faIls  for Hungy  from  34 to 22 pect  and for Polamd  fm  47 to 40 paen.
2'  This  is the  equivalt  of SITC.  Rev.3.  (26-2632)+(65-65911)+(84848144812-8813).21
(Hamilton  and  Martin,  1990:2).3Y  The MFA  group  contains  1,296  eight  dlgit  CN items,  of which  188  are
subject  to GSP rates (O  percent).? Textiles  and clothing  products  rank second  in tenms  of sharcs  in
industrial  product  exports. Tariffs  for these  products  are to be gradually  eliminated  by the  end of the sixth
year: in each  year  they  will be reduced  by one  seventh  of ihe level  prior to entry  into  force  of the ITAs.
Market  access  for these  products  is  governed  by quantitative  restrictions  rather  than  tariffs. Average
tariffs  for countries  having  GSP  stams  are close  to zero. The maxinum  rates  are higher  for Bulgaria  and
the FCSK,  simply  because  other  CE-S countries  did  not  export  any  items  subject  to this  rate. NTB  trade
coverage  ratios  for these  products,  which  are the highest  among  the groups  of industrial  products,  will not
be affected  by the ITAs. Protocol  1 of the ITAs, containing  provisions  applying  to trade in textile  and
clothing  products,  provides  that quotas will be negotiated  bilaterally  and new arrangements  will be
implemented  *... as soon  as the future  regime  goveniing  international  trade  in textile  products  has  emerged
from  the  multilateral  negotiations  of the  Uruguay  round.  "(Protocol  1, Article  3.2). Quantitative  restrictions
will be abolished  over  half of the period  decided  in the Uruguay  Round  negotiations.
Since  the MFA restricts  the volumes  of imports  through  quotas,  exports  can increase  by filling
previously  underutilized  quotas  or obtaining  increases  in quotas. The increase  in CEE-5  exports  to the EC
was  the result  of a combination  of these  two  factors  with  the latter  having  probably  a larger  influence.  The
CEE-5  had  exported  well  below  their  quotas  throughout  much  of the 1980s.32  With  a quota  utilization  rate
lower  than  90  percent  in the 1980s,  they  were  not  binding  for around  30 percent  of MFA  quotas  (Erzan  and
Holmes,  1992). In 1990  and 1991  the  EC signed  bilateral  agreements  increasing  quotas  and  market  access
for re-imports  into  the EC. CEE-5  economies  (excluding  Romania)  took  advantage  of the  improved  market
M Although  technically  they  were  not  qualified  as developing  countries,  CEE-5  economies  have  been  subject
to the  provisions  of the MFA.
3'  This  relatively  small  share  confirms  the  observation  that  GSP  schemes,  unaterally  grated by industial
countries,  as a rule  exclude  major  textile  and clothing  products  (see, e.g., Erzan,  Holmes  and Safadi,  1992)
32 For instance, the EC quota utilizationrates in 1982  were 65 percent for Bulgaria,  79 percent for the FCSK,
43 percmt for Hungary, 35 percent for Poland, and 73 percet  for Romania  (Trela  and Whaullcy,  1990:19).22
access, as their exports  increased  dramatically  in this period.? Taking into  account  that MFA imports  from
these countries  increased  in 1990 by at least one third (see footnote 32), this expansion  would not have
occurred without  increases  in EC quotas.3 4
Table  7: The MFA  Group:  Exporfl  to the  EC and Pr-IrAs  Market  Access
Exports Share  in Industrial  Index  1991  NTB  Coverage  Simple  Average  Range  of
1991  Exports,  1991  1988=100  Ratio,  Tariff  Rate  tariff  rames
Max-Min
(in USS  million)  (in percent)
Bulgaria  142  20.9  227  90.6  10.8  17-0.0
FCSK  630  13.6  202  87.6  10.7  17-0.0
Hungary  712  21.4  175  85.1  0.1  9.3-0.0
Poland  1099  17.6  258  88.8  0.0  8.6-0.0
Romania  480  28.2  96  86.2  0.1  ".3-0.0
Sources:  See  Table  2.
On -the  supply  side, it is noteworthy  that EC's expanding  inports of textiles  and clothing  from the
CEE-5  coincided  also  with  the implaton  of transformation-cm-stabilization  programs,  which  provided
a boost to MEA  expo ts. For instance,  the value of MFA imports  from Bulgaria  rose by 87 percent  in 1992
(the first full year of the program  in place), from the FCSK  by 53 percent  in 1991  (and  46 percent  in 1992),
from Hungary  increased  by 43 percent in 1990 (by 24 percent  in 1992),  and from Poland  by 74 percent in
1990 (35 percent in 1992). Overall, between 1988  and 1992,  the value of MFA imports  into the EC from
Bulgaria  increased  by 324 percent, from the FCSK by 194 percent, from Humgary  by 116 percent, from
Poland  by 248 percent, and from Romania  by 32 percent.'
33  It is apparent  when comparing  thetanmmal  rates of growth of MFA imports into the EC in 1989 and 1990.
The  rate of growth  of imports  from  Bulgana  rose  from 8 percent  to 52 pemnt, fom the FCSK  fram  (-)1.2  to 33
percent, from Hungary  hom 3.5to43  percen, and  from  Poland from4.  ito 71 percent. The  value of imports  from
Romania  fell by 1.6  percent.
3 For instnce, in 1992  the aveage  utilization  ratio  for  Polish  imports  of textiles  and  clothing  product  into  the
EC was 33 percent (Dunin-Wasowicz,  1993:18).
3  As a result, its shr  in their industrial  imports into the EC increased  especially  in the case of Balkan
countres where it almost doubled-for Bulgaria,  the share rose friom  15 percent  m 1988  to 29 percent in 1991 and
for RomaWia  from 20 persent to 39 percent (this was the only group of industrial  products discussed here that
recorded  an increase in 1992);:23
Whether  this expansion  is sustinable will  depend  on  domestic  developments  and  continued  inproved
access  to EC markets. As for the former, there is one important  factor pushing  to expand  supply  capacities.
This sector is particularly  attractive  to private entrepreneurs,  because of the low labor cost combined  with
the sector's low average capital  intensity in a situation of capital shortage  and deficient  financial  markets.
The EC may choose not to erect barriers to CEE-5 exports, simply  because EC producers bave increased
MFA exports to CEE-5  countries. Furthermore, the experience  of many developing  countries  suggest  that
quotas have not been effective  in preventing  flexible  and innovative  firms from expending  exports.36
D.  The ECSC Group
The ECSC product group, accounting  for a significant  share (albeit rapidly declining)  of CEE-5
exports (from Bulgaria a 12 percent of industrial exports in 1991, from the FCSK 14 percent. and from
Poland 12 percent), was not treated uniformly  in terms of concessions  granted  by the EC.  The new rules
of market access,  laid out in Protocol  2 of the ITAs, effectively  divide  the ECSC group into  three subgroups:
steel  products, coal  products  (including  some manganese  and iron ores) imported  by Germany  and Spain  and
coal products imported  by other EC countries.
Setu  This subgroup includes 554 eight digit CN items of which 522 are subject to GSP zero
rates (Its equivalent is SITC. Rev.3. 2821+28221+67-67151-67682).  The average tariff rate is in the
mid-range. With NTB coverage ratios ranging  between 57 and 75 percent, this group is the second most
"Nfl-driven"  among industial product groups idendfied in the ITAs (see Table 8);  The share of this
group in industrial imports into the EC varies across CEE-5 countries: in 1991 it was around 11 percent
for Bulgaria and the FCSK, and 5-6 percent for the remaining countries.  With the exception  of the
FCSK, the value of imports from other CEE-5 countries  lfel  precipitously in 1991, following a veiy
substantial increase in 1990, but picked up again in 1992  despite the contraction  in EC import demand
for steel products.
The ECSC protocol grants both nontariff and tariff concessions. As far as nontariff  barriers are
3  For an  exmensive  discussion,  see Global  Economic  Prospects  and  the  DR_elRinA  Countries  (1992)  and  Cable
(1990).24
concerned,  all quantitative  restrictions  are eliminated  on the date of entry into force of the rrAs.  Customs
duties levied on steel products are to be eliminated  after five years. 37 Taking into account that almost
all CN items failing in this group are subject  to GSP rates, tariff concessions  are not significant.
Table  8: The  "SteeP  ECSC  Sub-Group:  Exports  to the EC md Pre-ITAs  Market Access
Exports Share  in Industrial  Index  1991  NTB  Coverage  Simple  Average  Range  of
1991  Exports,  1991  1988=100  Ratio,  Tariff  Rate  tariff  rates
Max-Min
(in US$  million)  - n  perce  t
Bulgaria  77  11.4  227  74.6  5.4  lO-0.0
FCSK  489  10.5  202  64A  5.6  10-0.0
Hungry  139  4.2  175  58.2  0.0  3.2-0.0
Poland  280  4.5  258  S7.4  0.1  4.0-0.0
Romania  61  3.6  96  68.2  0.0  0.040.0
Sources:  See  Table  2.
This should  not imply  that all NTBs  will disappear  (to the contary, other instruments  have gained
prominence  as quantiatve restrictions  had been removed),  or that all tariffs will indeed  decline  accordg
to the schedule. Steel industries  in both the EC and CEE-5 counties have significant  surplu  capacity,
prouiding  slrong pressures  to export  and to protect  domestic makes  against  foreign  imports. 3 While  the
market share has remained  low (3.6 percent of EC imports in 1992),  penetrafion  by CEE-5 steel  imports
increased  dramatically  between 1988  and 1992  with Poland and the FCSK each  doubling  their  share in EC
imports.
This export  success  triggered calls for protectionist  measures. In 1993,  responding  to complaints
from domestic  steel  producers about  the "flood"  of cheap  imports  from Eastem Europe,  the EC approached
Hunpgran and Polish governments  to impose  voluntary  resais  and set quotas on imports  of some steel
products  (steel  coils, sheets, wire rod, strip, and cut lengths)  originating  in the Czech  Republic  and Slovak
37 At  the  begiing  of the  first  year  of ITAs  the  duties  are  reduced  to 80  percent  of the  basic  duties  and  fiher
lowered  to 60, 40, 20, 10  and 0 percent  (of  the  basic  duties)  at the  begining of  the second,  third,  fourth,  fifth  and
sixth  years, respectively.
3s It is estimated  that  the CEE-5  sted industry  works  at around  SO  percent  of its former  capacity  (Peel,  1993).25
Republic  above  which  puntive tariffs  (from  25 to 30 percent)  will  be imposed." In addition,  in November
of 1992  temporary  anti-dunping duties  were imposed  on seamless  steel and iron tubes imported  from the
CEE-3  countries.0
These  developments  under  the new ITA  regime  show  that the Agreements  have  not deprived  the SC
of trade management  instruments. The removal of quantitative  restrictions  have exposed CEE-5 steel
producers  to other, equally  potent trade-restraining  measues.  Given the political  clout of steel industries
in the EC as well as the dramatic  increase  in imports  from the CEE-3--fueled  largely  by the redirection  of
sales from domestic  markets  and the CMEA-the EC's recourse  to these  measures  comes  as no surprise.
Cetk  This group, consisting  of 14 eight digit CN items, embraces  coal products, iron ore and
concentrates,  iron and steel wastes (slags and scalings),  and manganese  ores and concenrates.  Except
for the FCSK and Poland, other CEE-5 countries are not significant  net exporters of these products.
There were no EC-wide  NTBs affecting  CEE imports  in 1990, but tariffs  were significantly  larger than
the average tariff on industrial  products (see Table 9).
Concessions  granted by the EC vary among  the CEE-5 countries  and they have not been granted
by all EC member countries. Except for Germany  and Spain, EC duties on imports  from the FCSK and
Poland are to be eliminated within a year, whereas those on inports  from Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania  will  be reduced  by 50 percent on Jamnary  1, 1994 and abolished  by the end of 1995. Germany
and Spain will maintain  duties until the end of the fourth year of the ITAs. As can be seen from Table
9, this differentiation  in treatment  affects  mainly imports  from the FCSK (the  share of Germany  is almost
100 percent) and to a lesser extent Poland (55 percent of EC inports goes to Germany  and Spain).
39 Te  quotas,  set for  the 1993-95  period,  will  change  in terms  of 1991  imports  (1991  =100)  according  to the
schedule:  1993=135;  1994=145;  1995=160.  Thus,  prohibitive  tariffs  will  not apply  annual  increases  in imports
of less  than  7 percent  in 1993,  of less  than  8 percent  in 1994,  and  of less  thanl  10pernt  in 1994. In the case  of
coils, 1991  levels  may be exceeded  by 100  percent in the 1993-95  period (Intemational  Trade  Reporter, May 1993,
p.831).
40  The  investigation  was  initiated  in December  1991. The  rates  varied  between  30.4  percent  on  these  imports
from  the FCSK,  21.7 percent  on imports  from  Hungary  and 10.8  percent  on imports  from  Poland. See  Eleventh
Annual  Report  from  the Commission  to the Euroeam  Parliament  on the Community's  Anti-Dumping  and Anti-
Subsidy  Activities  (1992),  Commission  of the European  Communities,  Brussels,  28 October  1993.26
Table  9: The  "Coal"  ECSC  Sub-Group:  Exports  to the  EC and Pre-rTAs  Market  Access
Exports,  1991  Share  in Industrial  NTB  Coverage Simple  Average Range  of
Expons,  1991  Ratio,  Tariff  Ratc  tariffs
Max-Min
(a)?  (bj)  (a)  (b)
(in USS  million)  (in percent)
Bulgaria  1  0  0.1  0  0  4.2  8.3-0.0
FCSK  1  140  neg.  3.0  0  5.9  8.3-0.0
Hungazy  3  1  0.1  neg.  0  2.0  2.0-0.0
Poland  268  285  4.3  4.6  0  4.3  8.3-0.0
Romania  0  0  0  0  0  0.0  0-0.0
'J This  subgroup  includes  SITC.Rev.3.  27862+281+321+(322-3223).
2/  (a)  The  EC  excluding  Gernmany  and  Spain.
(b)  Germany  and  Spain  only.
Sources:  See  Table  2.
Exports of coal products  are not likely to increase significantly  in the near future.  Increaszs  in
efficiency  of energy  use will reduce  domestic  consumption,  however,  coal production  is not likely  to expand
and may  even  contract  as many  coal  mims in the region  face  bankruptcy. In contrast  to steel  products,  there
was litle (if any) redirection  of sales from tbeCMEA.  The FCSK and Poland  were established  suppliers
Of  coal  to EC markets  well  before the  collapse  of the  CMEA. They  both sought  to minimize  coal shipments
to their former CMEA  parmers,  simply  because  coal was more marketable  in hard currency  markets  than
low quality  man  red goods. Thus, the contraction  in FSU import  demand  affected  raw materials  less
than  tmanufacures  and there was no explosion  in exports  to OECD  markets  as in many  industrial  products.
E.  The "Residual"  Free Trade Gro.
The residual  group is subject  to free trade upon entry into force of the ITAs. This group consists
of products  falling into CN 25-97 minus products identified  in the five groups discussed  above includig
imports  below ceiling  or falling  within  tariff quota. It icludes 5,078 eight  digit CN items of which  4,362
(68  percent of "fre-trade" itms) have  been subject  to GSP  rates. As a resut,  average  triffs  for this group
are below  ite-average for all industrial  products. CEE-5  exports  of this group were less  affected  by NTBs
than  any otha group of industial products  specified  in the iTAs-the average  NTB  coverage  ratio of between27
3.4 and 3.8 percent  is significantly  lower than  for any other  group except  for coal  products  (see Table 10).
Hence, the largest concessions  made by the EC pertained  to the "least sensitive"  markets in terms of
protection  offered  to domestic  producers.
The residual  group  accounts  for a large sware  of CEE-5  industrial  exports  to the EC. As can  be seen
from Table 10, in 1991  the country  share of this group  was between  32 percent  (Romania)  and 50 percent
(Hungary). If exports  below  tariff ceilings  and quotas  which  are duty free during the  first year of the ITAs
are included, then the free trade component-in  terms of 1991 export  baskets-goes up by 13 percentage
points for Romania  (to 47%), by 11 percentage  points for the FCSK  (to 55%) and Poland  (to 54%), by 10
percentage  points for Bulgaria  (to 53%), and by 9 percentage  points for Hungary  (to 58%).
Table 10:  The "Immediate  Free Tradell Group: Exports  to the EC  nd Pre-ITAs  Market Acess
Expons  Share  in Indusrial Index  1991  NTB  Coverage  Simple  Average  Range  of
1991  Expors. 1991  1988=100  Ratio,  Tariff  Rate  tariff.rates
Max-Min
(m USS million)  (mpercnt)
Bulgaria  293  43  132  3.6  5.6,  .37.9-0
FCSK  2074  44  188  3.8  5.7  39.7-0
Hungay  1680  50  218  3.7  0.0  14.0-0
Poland  2707  41  190  3;8  - 0.1  - 14J0-0
Romania  602  32  57  3A  0.0  6.2-0
Sources:  See  Table  2.
Imports  of the 'residual"  products  from  CEE-5  counties increased  more  slowly  than  othr idusti
groups. Between  1988 and 1991  the share of this group in CEE-5 idusrial  imports  declined  except for
imports  from Hungary  it increased  by almost 7 prcentage points from.42 to 49 percentr(seef  Table 11).41
It is noteworthy  that better export  performance,  as evidenced  by the declning share  of a free  trade "residual"
group in CEE-5 industrial  exports, in "more  protected"  than in "less  protected"  markets  also indicates  that
access to sensitive  markets  did not significandy  restrain  impors in the 1988-91  period-except  for steel
"'  A possible  explanation  is that  Hungy's  strategy  of economic  developmentundercetral  planning  had  been-
less biased in favor of heavy industry, i.e., steel and chemicals,  ta  other socialist  economies. Since steel and
chemical  products  (both  accounang  for  a very  sizble share-of  CEE-5  wiports  into  the  EC) in  the  EC as a ruleenjoy
a higher  level  of protection  than  other  products,  Hungary's  export  basket-with  a lower  share  of steel  and chemical
product-had a higher share of products  less vulnerable  to EC protectonist measures.28
Table 11:  Composition of CEE-5  Industrial Exports to the EC, by ITA groups, 1988-92
Bulgaria
1988  2.5  0.2  1  0.9  14.9  9.6  0.1  0.0  61.7
lass  2.1  0,4  12.6  15.7  14.2  0.0  0.0  55.0
1s90  1.4  0.3  13.6  19.1  17.3  0.3  0.0  47.9
1991  1.4  0.1  16.3  20.9  11.4  0.1  0.0  49.6
1992  0.9  0.0  14.0  29.5  8.0  0.2  0.0  47.4
FC  k  ...............................................................................................................  .........................................  . ._ FCSK
1989  0.6  0.0  24.4  13.2  12.6  0.1  2.8  46.4
1989  0.7  0.0  25.3  12.3  13.6  0.1  2.7  45.3
1990  0.6  0.1  24.2  13.6  14.2  0.0  3.0  44.4
1991  1.1  0.1  26.5  13.8  10.5  0.0  3.0  45.2
1992  1.3  0.0  25.9  13.7  10.4  0.0  2.3  48.4 ....  9.X...............................................................................................................................................  ...... _ ......
Hungary
1958  1.0  0.9  26.1  22.9  6.9  0.1  0.0  42.1
1989  1.5  1.0  26.7  21.5  6.6  0.2  0.0  43.6
1990  1.0  0.9  24.9  21.6  6.7  0.1  0.1  44.7
1991  0.7  0.5  24.3  21.4  4.2  0.1  0.0  48.9
1992  0.5  0.3  23.7  21.8  3.6  0.0  0.0  50.1
Poland
1998  0.2  0.3  22.4  13.8  4.2  9.6  3.5  46.2
1989  0.3  0.2  22.9  13.7  6.0  8.7  3.2  45.0
1990  0.6  0.4  23.7  15.2  6.4  0.0  3.9  44.9
1991  0.4  0.8  23.6  17.6  4.5  4.3  4.6  44.2
1992  0.7  0.7  24.4  19.0  4.3  3.7  3.5  43.6
..........................................  ........................... ,..,,,,,.,,.,,  ,  ,,,,,  ...................................... , ,  ..........................  ..  ....
Romanla
1988  0.1  6.1  26.7  19.9  4.2  0.0  0.0  45.1
1989  0.2  5.2  23.1  19.3  4.0  0.0  0.0  48.2
1990  0.1  2.7  28.0  26.4  4.4  0.0  0.0  38.5
1991  0.0  1.6  31.4  28.2  3.6  0.0  0.0  35.3
*  1992  0.0  0.4  30.4  39.0  6.7  0.0  0.0  23.5
Sources:  Calculated from data in the United Nations  COMTRADE  data base and the Interim Trade Agreements.29
products  whose  rate of growth  was  below  the average  rate of growth  of EC industrial  imports  from all CEE-
5 economies.  Imports  of chemical  products,  faling mainly  in the "quotalfive-year-delayed"  group,  expanded
at higher  rates than  the avenge for ai industrial  products  and their share also increased.
VI. TIME PROFILE  OF ATTAINING  FREE TRADE  IN INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTS
Assuming  that the measures  liberalizing  trade in industrial  products  are implemented  according  to
the schedule  set in the ITAs, one may estimate  the effect  of the pace of transition  on industrial  products  in
terms  of 1992  export  baskets. Since  the ITAs  signed  with  the troika  economies  in December  1991  went into
force  on March 1, 1992,  some  portion  of their imports  were free of tariff and nontariff  restrictions  in 1992.
The share of freely traded  industial products  was larger  than  the  residual' group-which accounted  for 46
percent  of industal  imports  from the FCSK,  50 percent  of industial import from Hungary,  and 44 percent
of indusial  imports  from Poland-because  some  products  falling into  the 'quota/five-year-delayed'  group
obtained  unrestrined access to EC markets5  Including  below quota imports  would raise the share of
freely trade products  quite significantly  for three countries:  to 54 percent  br  the FCSK  and Poland, and to
57 percent for Hungary.
Table 12 presents estimates  of the sbares  of freely-taded in industial products  in terms of 1992
export baskets. These shares were tabulated  on the basis of the foilowing  assumptions:  (i) all relevant
provisions  of the ITAs  will be applied  as scheduled;  (ii) below-qota/ceiling  imports  into the EC equal 50
percent  of imports  of the "quota/five-year-delayed"  free trade  group  as in 1992;  and (iii)  textiles  and clothing
trade will be conducted  on the basis of bilateral  quotas.
The time path of ataining duty-free  trade in industial products  and the share of the free trade
component  is determined  by the  shares of exports  of different  groups,  the share of industrial  exports  in total
exports  of that country  to the EC, and differences  in liberalizing  provisions  concernig the rate of growth
in tariff quotas/ceilings  on exports. The  time path  towards  free trade  has two  jumps: the  first occurs  during
the first year  of the Agreements  when around  50 percent  of products  obtain  free access  to EC markets;  the
42 For the  reasons  discussed  earlier,  free  trade  shares  calculated  for the sample  presented  in Table  6 are used
to esfimate  the fee  trade portion  of this group. For the Balkan  countries-which  signed  the ITAs a year later and
for which  no data are available  to match their imports  with quotas or ceilings-we used the avenage  of the troika
coefficients.30
second  in the sixth year of the ITAs  when  the remaining  tariffs  are removed  (this increases  this share  to 100
percent if duties on MFA products  are removed).
The duty-free trade component  is the largest in Czechoslovak  and Polish exports to the EC.
Although  industrial  products accounted  for 93 percent of Romanian  imports (see Table 1), the free access
for its imports  is smaller  due to the large share of MFA  products  which increased  from 28.2 percent  in 1991
(see Table 7) to 39 percent in 1992.  In terms of their share in industrial  exports, the VisegrAd  countries
benefit more from fully liberalized  access to EC markets  than Romania and to a lesser extent Bulgaria
because of the lower proportion  of MFN products in their exports.
Table 12: Shee  of Duty-Free  Goods in CEE-5  Industial and Total Expors to the EC, 1992-98
1992  1993  1994  1995  1096  1997  1998
..- ;- - (shareci  indultrial  pworts,  in  percent)
Bulgaria  54  54'  57  58  59  60  61
PCSK  59  63  65  67  71  86  86
Hungary  62  64  66  67  '68  -78  78
Poland  56  63  65  66  72  81  81
Romania  '  39  39'  42  44  46  48  61
CEE-5  58  69  70  70  71  74  80
(share  in tora  morts,  in  percent)
Bulgaria  43  43  45  45  46  47  56
FCSK  55  59  61  62  66  80  80
Hungary  48  50  51  52  53  60  60
Poland  47  53  55  56  61  69  69
Romania  36  36  39  41  43  45  57
CEE-5  44  59  60  60  61  63  69
Note:  In computing  the  duty-free  shares,  the commodity  composition  of flows  in 1992  is applied  to the anticipated
customs  stais of each  item  in all subsequent  years.
Source:  Sce  Table  6.
Another  factor  responsible  for the different  traniton  paths is related  to the different  provisions  for
quota/ceiting  increases. Until 1995  the share of liberalized  products  is the largest  for Hungary's  exports  to
the EC.  In 1993-94  the difference  between the FCSK and Poland  on the one band, and Hungary  on the
other, decres  etnks  to the fister increase in duty-free quotas/ceilings  for the former countries.  In31
addition to the different pace in quota increases, the FCSK and Poland move ahead because of the
elimination  of duties  on their coal imports  into Germany  and Spain  in 1996;
A.  Copenhagen  Summit  Concessions
The concessions  granted by the EC summit  in Copenhagen  in June 1993 are significant  for two
reasons. First, the EC explicitly  recognized  the aspiration  of the CEE-5 countries  to acquire membership
status, although no specific timetable  was agreed upon.  Second, it granted the CEE-5 further trade
concessions  for industrial  products. The significance  of the latter  is that they  accelerate  the transition  to free
access  to EC markets by a year.'  Specifically,  these new concessions  provide  for abolishing  tariffs: (i)
on steel  products  after four rather than five  years; (ii) on the "four-year-delayed'  free trade group  after two
instead  of four years; and (iii) on the MFA group in frve years rather than six years.'  Other concessions
provide for an increase in the growth rate of tariff-free  quotas/ceilings  by '10 percentage  points over the
ITAs' rates of 15  percent (Hungary)  and 20 percent (others)  per annum  and accelerates  the elimination  of
triffs  by two years on the "five-year-delayed"  free trade group.
How meaningful  are these concessions? Table 13 highlights  the differences between  the ITA
schedule  and the schedule  as mmofied  by the Copenhagen  Summit  (again  using te  1992  actual  commodity
composition  of flows as weights). Within the next two years (1994-95),  the net gain for former troika
countries, as measured by the increase in share of products obtaining  duty-free access to EC markets,
amounts  to 2-3 percentage  points.  The gains for Bulgaria and Romania are negligible  except for 1997.
However,  one should  also take into  account  an accelerated  increase  in margins  of preference,  esecially for-
the "quota/five-year-delayed"  group: although  the new provisions  do not have a large impact  in terms of
increasing the liberalized share of exports, they increase the competitive  position of the countries,
particularly  of the Visegrid group. The accelerated  schedule  of reductions  in triffs  on textles and clotig
may have a similar impact, assuming that CEE-5 quotas are not binting.  The major benefits of the
Copenhagen  concessions  are realized  in the fifth  year of the ITAs  when the duty-free  c  increased
- In addition,  the EC summit  offered-concessions  on imports  of farm  products  (levies  and dities are to be
reduced  by 60 percent  in two and a half  years).
4In  addition,  the  EC has pledged  to improve  rules  concerning  "outward  processing."32
by 6-13 percentage  points. (If one includes  MFA products,  this share increases  substantially  for all CEE-5
countries. 43)
Table 13: The Significance  of the Copenhgen Concessions:  Net Change  In "Liberalized"  hnports,
Relative  to the ITA Schedule.
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
n milaion  of US dollars)
Bulgaria  n.a.  6  10  11  83  0
FCSK  87  131  148  841  0  0
Hungary  48  87  103  245  0  0
Poland  95  200  218  499  0  0
Romania  n.a.  6  0  114  0  0
CEE-5  229  431  479  1710  83  0
(share in indusiaI  imports,  in percent)
Bulgaria  n.a.  1  1  1  9  0
FCSK  1  2  2  13  0  0
Hlmgary  1  2  3  6  0  0
Poland  1  3  3  6  0  0
Romania  n.a.  0  0  0  7  0
CEE-5  1  2  2  8  1  0
Note:  The  canges in customs  status  in each  fiutre year are  weighted  according  to the commodity  composition
of flows  in 1992.
Source:  See Table  6.
B.  Reliabit  of Nwtv-Free  Share Esimates: How "Free" is a Free Trade Regime?
The esimates of the free trade share in CEE-5  exports  to the EC are based on assumptions  tbat: (i)
once tariff and nontariff measures  are removed ihese  products will contine  to enjoy free access to EC
I
markets;  and (ii) the export  baskets  will remain  essentily  unchanged  over the next  four to five years.  bhe
threat of managed  trade-to borrow an apt phrase from Ostry (1993)-is writ large in the ITAs whose
provisions contain a rich array of loosely defined safeguard clauses and, thus, '...open  to virtually
4  The  reason  for not taking  account  of the  concessions  on texiles and cloting products  (duty-free  access  to
EC markets  after five  years instead  of six  years) is that MFA  trade  remains  managed. Its futun is tied to the
Uruguay  Round.  Including  MFA products  mises  the net gain  as follows:  for Bulgaria  (29%),  FCSK  (14%),
Hungary  (22%),  Poland  (19%),  and  Romania  (39%).33
unconained  administrative  discretion"  (Ostry, 1993:14). It is impossible,  however,  to predict  how  these
administrative  powers  will  be used. On the one hand, the period  following  the implementation  of the ITAs
in March 1992  witnessed  numerous  attempts  at reversing  the liberalization  but they  were mostly  limited  to
imports  of steel  products." For instance,  the EC levied  provisional  anti-dumping  duties  on steel  tubes  from
the FCSK  and Poland  in August  1992  and imposed  quantitative  restrictions  on some  types  of steel  originating
in Czech  and Slovak  Republics  in April 1993.
On the positive  note, expanding  ties with the CEE-5  are also likely to mobilize  lobbies  in favor of
further  trade liberalization.  Indicative  of this development  is Thomson's  successful  intervention  to increase
the EC quota on imports  of cathode-ray  tubes from Poland:  Thomson  has invested  in a factory  producing
these goods  in Poland (The  Economist,  May 1, 1993:55). Moreover,  EC exports  of sensitive  products  to
some CEE-5 countries  have increased significanfly,  making them vulnerable  to retaliatory measures--
measures  aleady considered  by some  CEE-5  governments.47  Thus, although  the ITAs  leave a lot of room
for a retreat to protectionism,  its occurrence  on a significant  scale  does  nOt  seem  to be a likely  developmert.
CEE-5  export  baskets  will  undoubtedly  change  in response  to opportunities  offered  by the ITAs,  but
not significantly  within  the next dtree or four years. Change  in export  baskets calls for modifications  in
technologies  and distrbution networks. This in turn calls for capital  outlays.4' InvestMent  activity  was
down throughout  the region in the 1989-92  period.  Although  there was quite a significant  shift in the
composition  of imports  (see Table 11), it did not have a substantial  impact  on estimates  of the free trade
component  with  the exception  of imports  from the Balkan  countries. Comparison  of estimates  of liberalized
trade under the ITAs, in terms of 1991 and 1992 export baskets to the EC, supports  this view.  The
46  The other  product,  affected  by an anti-dumping  investigation,  was ferro-silicon  imported  from Poland.
Provisional and-dumping  duties, imposed in May 1991, were converted into definitve anti-dumping  duties on
December 18, 1992 (see Eleventh Annual Report from the Comnission to the European Parliament  on  the
Community's  Anti-Dumping  and Anti-Subsidy  Activities,  p.61).
4"  Officials  have often stated publicly  that t...  thqe reserve the right to retaliate in the case of any decision
hurting  (...)  their  exports." International  Trade  Reporter, August 18, 1993:1379.
o  At present,  capital is scarce: one may expect  that foreign  direct investment  will increase once  uncertainty
associated  with  market access  in the EC is reduced.34
difference  is negligible  for the FCSK, Hungary and Poland.  The estimates  for Bulgaria  and Romania
seem to be much less reliable, as the composition  of their exports to the EC has been undergoing  a
significant  change.  In 1992 it changed  rather significantly  towards sensitive  products and, as a result,
estimates  in terms of 1991 export  baskets  yield a much higher  proportion  of products  with free accessO
VII. CONCLUSION
The ITAs substantially  improve access to  EC mar;ets for CEE-5 exporters by immediately
eliminating  tariffs on some industrial  products  and gradually  reducing  tariffs  on others, although  its short-
term impact is significantly  lower than that of granig  GSP status.  The largest increase in the share of
liberalized  imports  occurs upon entry  into force of the Agreements. In 1992,  the first year of the ITAs  for
the Visegr&d  countries, around 60 percent of their industrial exports obtained duty-free access to EC
markets.  The equivalent  shares for Bulgarian  and Romanian  exports in 1993 were 54 and 39 percent,
respectively. In the subsequent  five years the share of duty-free  exports registers  steady  growth (in terms
of 1992  exports)  and jumps sharply  in the sixth year, i.e., once all trade liberalizing  measures  are in effect.
These  estimates  tend  to underrate  the  extent of improvement  in market  access  for industrial  products
ofiginating  in CEE-5  countries. In estimatig the liberalized  component,  no account  is explicidy  taken of
tariff reductions  which increase  margins  of preference  for CEE-5  products. These are quite significant  in
spite  of the EC's insistence  on only  gradually  improving  access  to markets  for sensitive  products. Note  that
anmual  tariff reductions  granted  in the  fTAs  range  between  14.3  percent  (MFA  products)  and 50 percent  (the
"one-year  delayed' group) of the basic MEN rate.  Furthermore,  the decisions  taken at the Copenhagen
summit  cut by one fifth the time it will take to reach the top of the EC preferential  trade pyramid,  now
occupied  by EFTA  couraies.  These  reductions  translate  into a competitive  edge  over other  sulppiers. Tbese
concessions  will assure  the CEE-5  of a significant  advantage  over potential  competitors  from other former
CMEA  countries  with comparative  advantage  in many  similar  products  because  of similarities  of investment
49 Depending  on the year, it varies  between  (-)1 and (+)1 percentage  point  for the Visegr*d  countnies.
economies.
T  The  difference  between  estimates  in terms  of 1992  and 1991  export  baskets  is enormous  for Romania,
ringing  between  (-)22  percentage  points  in 1992  and (-)17  percentage  points  in 1998. For Bulgaria  the  estmates
in terms  of a 1992  export  basket  are  by  4 perutage points  lower  in 1993-97  and  8 percentage  points  lower  in 1998.35
patterns  under central planning. It will also give them an advantage  over exporters  from Mediterranean
countries  which  benefit from preferential  arrangements  with the EC.
While it is impossible  to predict the extent to which bflaterally  negotiated  quotas on Imports  of
textile and clothing  product  will be binding  for CEE-5 producers, they were not limiting in the 1990D92
period. Annual reductions  in tariffs on products  covered  by the MFA by one seventh  of initial  rates will
increase the attractiveness  of imports from CEE-5 countries.  This situation, combined with recently
expanding  EC exports  of textiles  and clothing  to some  CEE-5 countries  (especially  Poland),  may assure  that
quotas will not become binding.  If one assumes  that they are not binding, then the liberalized  share of
industrial  products in the seventh  year of the ITAs increases  significandy.
The threat of the EC's retreat into protectionism  is writ large in the Agreements. There are no
provisions  that would  prevent an increase  in managed  trade through informal  agreements  and and-dumpig
threats. This danger is particularly  present  in "traditional"  industrial  sectors (mainly  steel). It should  be
reduced to some extent once institutional  provisions  conceming  the rules of competition  and subsidies  in
CEE-5  countries  are in force.
In all, this research  does not give support  to often-expressed  views,  both in Central/Eastern  Europe
and in the West, that trade liberalizing  concessions  offered  in the ITAs  do not benefit  CEE-5  economies. 51
It does not support the opinion tbat the ITAs '..have  turned out to be disappointingly  limited" Mg
Economist,  May 1-7, 1993:56). No doubt an immediate  abolition  of all tariff and nontariff  barriers on
imports  from CEE-5 economies  would  yield higher  benefits  than those offering  duty-free  access  to around
50 percent  of their exports. But given  the political  underpinnings  of the EC trading  regime, more relevant
standards  of reference  are their market access  before  the collapse  of central  planning  and in comparison  to
other countries.  Measured  against  these frames of reference,  the ITAs provide for a rapid extension  of
liberalized  market access  for industrial  imports  from this region.
51 See for instce  Marsh  and Barber  (1993)  and Pomfret  (1993).36
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